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Political action committees (PACs) are instruments through which interest groups 
channel political contributions to candidates (Or public office. They aggregate individual 
contributions and seek to efficiently allocate receipts among political contests in order to 
influence election outcomes. Though initially the sole province of organized labor, political 
action committees are now widely utllitzed by businesses, associations, membership 
organizations, and a great variety of other interests.
Political action committees have emerged as a chief source of political funding In 
congressional campaigns as a consequence of their prolific growth since the early 1970s. Those 
critical of this development allege PACs have had a negative impact on elections, thwarting 
electoral competition, disrupting balances of power among conventional economic and political 
cleavages (i.e. business vs. labor, Democrat vs. Republican), and contributing to the decline of 
the political parties. Opponents to this view reject these contentions, and assert that PACs 
provide a legitimate, constitutionally-protected means of political expression that have fostered 
healthy Interest group articulation and have broadened the base of political participation.
Critics futher allege that PACs have distorted the legislative process, enabling special 
interests to exert a disproportionate influence on it at the expense of the national or public 
Interest. They contend that the legislative behavior of Incumbents is affected by the creation of 
a sense of obligation to special Interests resulting from their contributions and by the creation 
of an incumbent dependency on special Interests for financial support. PAC advocates, however, 
contend that contributions are made not to alter Incumbent legislative behavior in a manner 
inconsistent with preheld philosophical or constituency-based views, but rather, are made to 
support Incumbents sympathetic to their Interests' concerns who share the interests' 
conception of what constitutes good public policy.
This paper saaks to assass tha adequacy of these competing contentions. Though PACs 
operate at both the state and federal level, this paper will confine its analysis to Federal 
elections, specifically, Congressional elections. It will analyze PAC behavior, from which 
inferences will be made regarding their motivations, and analyze the consequences of PAC 
behavior in the aggregate. It will also bring relevant research to bear on the issue. The Issue is 
of fundamental Importance because attempts at campaign finance reform are invariably 
predicated on the perceived harm of PACs to the political system, as is the case with present 
efforts. An examination of PACs is auspicious as the Senate considers S.2, sponsored by Robert 
Byrd (D-WV) and David Boren (D-OK), which places an aggregate limit on PAC receipts with 
expenditure limits tied to partial public funding. Though S.2 currently has a sufficient number 
of cosponsors for passage, opponents have repeatedly threatened to Min ster the measure to 
prevent its passage. Indeed, Senate consideration of the measure has proven to be quite volatile, 
including the parliamentary arrest of one senator for failure to appear on the Senate floor. The 
need for more dispassionate consideration Is dear.
This paper will first briefly examine the historic development of political action 
committees. It will then examine the statutory provisions relevant to PACs. Data on PAC 
activity will be presented, followed by a cursory examination of PAC organization and operation. 
This will allow tor an analysis of the Impact of PACs on congressional elections, incumbent 
behavior, and the legislative process generally. The paper will conclude with observations 
attempting to place PACs in perspective, followed by a comprehensive assessment of the role of 
PACs in our political system.
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Congress in 1943 prohibited unions from contributing to candidates tor Federal office.
3The Congress of Industrial Organization responded in that year by establishing a separate accoun 
for channeling voluntary contributions to political candidates, the first modern political action 
committee. CIO-PAC provided important precedents for this mode of political activity, 
considered quite controversial at its inception. Other unions soon emulated this arrangement. 
When the AFL and CIO merged, their PACs were consolidated, creating the Committee on Political 
Education, which became the greates source of labor contributions. By 1968 there were 37
national labor political committees, which made disbursements of $7.1 milllon.1
Corporations were slow to develop PACs, instead relying on large individual
contributions to fund its candidate preferences. The American Medical Political Action
Committee (AMPAC) of the AMA, founded in 1961, was the first significant PAC to represent
business or professional interests. It was followed In 1963 by the establishment of the Business
•Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) by the National Association of Manufacturers.? 
These two constituted 61 percent of all national business PAC expenditures in 1968, making
expenditures of more than $1.2 million in that year.3
Labor's preeminence had begun to erode even prior to the mid 1970s. Labor spent $8.5 
million at the national level In 1972, in comparison to expenditures of $6.8 million by business 
and professional committees. Labor PACs thus enjoyed only a 33 percent advantage by tills time. 
This measure however falls to capture the substantial advantage labor has enjoyed in 
orchestrating voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities in tapping its impressive
manpower pool.*
The modem PAC era emerged from a series of legislative enactments, judicial decisions 
and administrative rulings. These included the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its 
1974 and 1976 amendments, the Supreme Court's rulings In i k m u  i i s
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(1972) and Buntov v. Valeo (1976), and the FEC's SUNPAC advisory opinion (1975). These 
derided ambiguities In the law and institutionalized the political action committee as a vehicle
for campaign funding, thereby providing a dim ate conducive to PAC proliferation.5 Each 
legislative enactment was the produd of vigorous campaigning by relevant interests, 
particularly labor. The consequences of these changes (and the Court and FEC dedsions) 
however were largely unanticipated by those Involved. Regardless the net effect of these 
developments was the creation of the statutory and judicial scheme that exists today.
Statutory Provisions
Despite its common usage, the term 'political action committee* is strictly a colloquial 
expression that appears no where in Federal statutes. These statutes, however, are what define 
and regulate this entity. The Federal Election Campaign Act makes reference to the term 
"political committee*, defined at 2 USC 431 as induding any party committee, any separate 
segregated fund, and any "committee, dub, association, or other group of persons" raising or 
expending more than $1000 per calendar year. A party committee, that is, one affiliated with a 
political party, Is excluded from the accepted definition of a political action committee, as is the
official authorized campaign committee of the candidate.^ The latter two definitions of the 
"political committee" comprise what is known as the political action committee. The distinction 
between the two is that the separate segregated fund, by far the more prevalent, is affiliated
with a sponsoring organization, while the other Is not7
The separate segregated fund is not defined by Federal statute but rather is the product of 
the historic experience of labor, and subsequently others, in responding to the prohibition 
against the use of union and corporate treasury funds for political contributions. As mentioned, 
the separate segregated fund was established to receive and distribute voluntary contributions
5to political candidates, apart from the treasury funds and consistent with statutory 
prohibitions.8
Though labor unions, corporations, and banks are prohibited from contributing to 
Federal candidates, 2 USC 44lb (b )(2) provides that this prohibition shall not include Internal 
labor union or corporate communications to union members or corporate stockholders and 
executive personnel, respectively, nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives aimed 
at those groups, and
the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate 
segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation, labor 
organization, membership organization, cooperative, or cotporation without 
capital stock.9
The first two provisions have important implications, primarily for labor. The third provision 
sanctions the establishment of a separate segregated fund, and permits the parent organization to 
underwrite Its administration and solicitation expenses.
A separate segregated fund is commonly referred to as a connected political action 
committee, connected by means of its parent sponsorship. Connected PACs by statute may solicit 
contributions without restriction solely from their restricted classes. Labor may solicit 
members and their families at any time, as may corporate PACs solicit stockholders or executive 
personnel and their families. Twice annually labor and corporate PACs may 'crossover* to the 
other's class. PACs affiliated with trade associations may solicit from stockholders and executive 
personnel of association member corporations and their families provided they are granted 
permission by the corporation, which may approve solicitations from only one trade association
per calendar year.10
The second category of "political committee' considered a political action committee is the 
'nonconnected* PAC, which is not affiliated with any parent organization. In contrast to the
separate segregated fund, the nonconnected PAC, by definition, has no sponsoring organization to 
assume the costs of creation and administration of the PAC and costs of solicitation of 
contributions. These costs must be paid from the voluntary contributions the PAC receives.
This constitutes a major disadvantage to this type of PAC. This disadvantage is offset, however, 
by the fact that the nonconnected PAC is unencumbered by the solicitation restrictions imposed
upon the affiliated PAC. It may solicit the general public as often as it wishes.1 1
Political action committees are bound by the contribution limits of individuals, that is, 
$1,000 per Federal candidate per election, $20,000 per year to national political party 
committees, and $5,000 per year to other political committees, unless the PAC qualifies as a 
'multicandidate political committee*. To do so a PAC must be in existence for six months, 
receive contributions from more than fifty persons, and make contributions to at least five 
Federal candidates. Such a committee may contribute up to $5,000 per Federal candidate per 
election, $15,000 to a national political party committee, and $5,000 to any other political 
committee. The Incentives to become a multicandidate political committee are strong and the
criteria are relatively easy to satisfy. The result is that most PACs do indeed qualify as such.12 
As a result of the landmark Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), PACs may make 
Independent expenditures, those made without consultation with any candidate or campaign, 
without restriction.
Multiple PACs may be established by a parent organization, though all are bound by one 
set of contribution limits. PACs must disclose periodically their receipts, expenditures and 
contributions to the Federal Election Commission, a six-member bipartisan commission 
established in part to administer and enforce the limitation and disclosure provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act. 13
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7Aggregate Data
An understanding of the impact of PACs on the political system should begin with an 
examination of the extent and nature of PAC activity in the aggregate. This section presents data, 
as compiled by the Fede.ai Elections Commission, for this purpose.
PACs have experienced tremendous growth since the advent of the modern PAC era in the 
early 1970s. This is manifested in part by the number of PACs in existence. Table 1 presents 
data on the number of PACs registered with the FEC at year's end by iype of committee from 
1 9 7 4 - 1 9 8 6 .
Table 1: PAC Growth Since 1974
Category 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 8 1 9 6 0 1 1 1 2 1984 1 2 M
Corporate 89 433 785 1 2 0 6 1 4 6 9 1 6 8 2 1 7 4 4
Labor 201 224 217 297 380 394 384
T /M /H 318 489 453 576 649 698 745
Nonoonnected 162 378 723 1 0 5 3 1 0 7 7
Cooperative 12 42 47 52 56
Corps, w/o Stock 24 56 103 130 151
Totals 608 114 6 1 6 5 3 2551 3371 4 0 0 9 4 1 5 7
Source: Federal Elections Commission 14
inspection of the data reveals an Impressive 580 percent increase in the total number of 
PACs from 1974 to 1986. The rate of growth has declined steadily, however, from 1978.
From 1978 to 1980, the rate of growth was 54 percent; this rate was a paltry 3.7 percent 
from 1984 tc 1986. It may be that overall growth of PACs has begun to stabilize in terms of 
number. It is significant to note from the data that while corporate PACs increased In number 
by 3.7 percent from 1984 to 1986, labor PACs actually declined by 2.5 percent for that period.
There are two shortcomings of this data. The first is that it may tend to overstate the 
prevalence of PACs. In 1986, for example, only 3,152 of the 4,157 PACs in existence at year's
end, or 69 percent, actually made contributions to candidates.1® Second, the data does not 
reflect levels of financial activity. Thus the advantage enjoyed by corporate and 
trade/membership/health committees over labor committees may be overstated.
A second and perhaps more reliable measure of PAC presence and growth is their level of 
financial activity during this period, as measured by their adjusted receipts, adjusted 
expenditures, and contributions to congressional candidates.
Table 2: Financial Activity of PACs since 1974 fin millions!
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Election Cycle Receipts Expenditures Contributions
1 9 7 4 25.0 12.5
1 9 7 6 54.0 52.9 22.6
1 9 7 & 80.0 77.4 35.2
1 9 8 0 1 3 7 .7 1 3 1 .2 55.2
1 9 8 2 1 9 9 .5 1 9 0 .2 83.6
1 9 8 4 2 8 8 . 7 2 6 6 .8 1 0 5 .3
1 9 8 6 3 5 2 . 9 3 3 8 .3 1 3 2 .2
Source: 1974-1984 data: Herbert E. Alexander and Brian A. Haaaertv.FInancina the 1984 
Election (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co.,
1987), p. 110.
1986 data: FEC1®
Examination of the data reveals steady growth in each cycle in alt three indices, though
the rates of growth have declined since the 1970s. Contributions to candidates in 1986
increased 26 percent from the 1984 level, the same figure by which the 1984 level exceeded 
that of 1982. Nonetheless the data suggest continued future growth.
Table 3 breaks down contributions to congressional candidates by type from 1978 to
9
1986 lo reveal patterns in growth across categories and allow comparison among them. 
Table 3: Contributions to Candidates. 1978-1986 fin millions)
1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 l a & f i
Corporate $9.8 $ 1 9 .2 $ 2 7 .5 $ 3 6 .2 $ 4 5 .9
Labor 10.3 13.2 20.3 25.1 29.8
T / M / H 11.3 15.9 2 1 .9 26.9 32.8
Nonconnected 2.8 4.9 10.8 14.7 18.7
Coops and Corps, w/o Stk. 1.0 2.0 3.2 4.0 4.9
Total 35.2 55.2 83.6 1 0 6 .9 132.1
Source: 1978-1982 data: Larrv J. Sabato. PAC Power: Inside the World of Pollllcal Action 
Committees (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984), p. 15.
1984 data: Alexander and Haggerty, p. 111. (Includes $1.5 million to presidential 
candidates)
1986 data: FEC1?
Table 3 reveals a pattern of steady growth in each category. Labor's position, however, 
has significantly deteriorated vis-a-vis corporate's position as a source of contributions, 
despite keeping pace with growth in trade/membershlp/health PACs. Many feel this does not 
bode well for labor's interests, a contention that will be later examined.
PACs have also grown as a percentage of total candidate receipts. Table 4 illustrates this
point.
Table 4: PAC Contributions as a Percentage of Camnalon Receipts
Election Cvda tifiuaftjCaodUatas
1 9 7 8 11 % 21 %
1 9 8 0 16 % 26 %
1 9 8 2 16 % 29 %
1984 17  % 34 %
1 0
1 9 8 6  21 % 34 %
Source: FEC18
The data reveals an increasing candidate reliance on PACs through other sources, 
primarily individuals, still constitute a substantial majority of total receipts, particularly for 
Senate candidates.
Having thus examined the extent of PAC activity and growth, It is instructive to examine 
the present distribution of PAC funds. Two salient measures are distribution by political party 
and by candidate status. Tables 5 and 6 present these dimensions for the most recent election 
cycle by type.
Table S: PAC Contributions by Party. 1985-1986
C atesm Republican
Corporate 38.9 % 61.1 %
Labor 92.5 % 7.5 %
Trade/M em bership/Health 48.8 % 51.2 %
Nonconnected 57.8 % 42.2 %
Cooperative 56.7 % 43.3 %
Corporation without Stock 50.6 % 49.8 %
Total 56.4 % 43.6 % Source:
Calculated using FEC data. 19
As shown by the data, the partisan advantage enjoyed by the Democrats stems primarily 
from the strongly partisan support of labor, coupled with substantial levels of support from 
corporate and trade/membership/health PACs. Labor PACs contributed 92.5 percent of their 
contributions to Democratic candidates, while corporate PACs and Trade/Membershlp/Health 
PACs showed a preference for Republican candidates, contributing to them 61.1 and 51.2
11
percent of their funds, respectively. The Democratic preference can be explained in part by the 
fact that there are more Democratic incumbents in Congress, and as shown below, PACs prefer 
incumbents to challengers and open seat candidates.
Table 6: PAC Contributions bv Candidate Status. 1985-1986
Category Incumbent Challanpar Open Seat
Corporate 76.3 % 7.9 % 15.8 %
Labor 57.6 % 24.6 % 17.8 %
T rade/M em bershlp/Health 77.1 % 8.6 % 14.3 %
Nonconnected 50.6 % 25.1 % 24.3 %
Cooperative 83.6 % 7.5 % 9.0 %
Corporation without Stock 76.7 % 10.4 % 12.7 %
Total 68.9 % 14.2 % 16.9 %
Source: Calculated using FEC data.20
The data reveals a pronounced preference for incumbents, receiving 68.9 percent of PAC 
contributions, over nonincumbents, receiving only 31.1 percent. The preference is most 
substantial in the case of trade/membershlp/health PACs and corporate PACs, allocating to 
incumbents 77.1 and 76.3 percent of their funds, respectively. This preference is less clear in 
the case of nonconnected PACs and labor PACs, allocating to nonincumbents 49.4 and 42.4 
percent of their funds, respectively.
P A C  Operation
Despite Its substantial utility, the preceding data provides only a partial understanding 
of the PAC phenomenon. This section will focus on the internal aspects of political action 
committees and their relations with one another. It seeks to provide information necessary for
subsequent analysis of the influence of PACs on congressional elections and on the legislative 
process.
The most striking observation to be made of the PAC presence Is the tremendous diversity 
of interests represented. It would appear that nearly every conceivable interest and segment of 
society is represented by a PAC. Examples include SIXPAC of the beer distributors, EGGPAC of 
the United Egg Producers, and Dr. Pepper PAC of the soft drink by that name. Examples of 
represented groups range from senior citizens and gay rights advocates to Hispanics for a free
Cuba and Concerned Italian Americans for Better Government.21
Diversity is also striking among more conventional PACs. Federal Election Commission 
classifications take little account of the variation in interests among PACs. While there Is often 
a certain fundamental commonality of interests within groupings or within segments of these 
groupings, in many instances there is substantial diversity. In corporate PACs, for example, 
there is often significant variation both among PACs representing different industries and among 
PACs representing different firms within an industry.
Despite this diversity, however, there Is often consultation and coordination of PAC 
activity. The Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) is a leading source of 
political Information among corporate and trade PACs. BIPAC conducts briefings with PAC 
representatives on a monthly basis. While it exerts no pressure to direct contributions to 
preferred candidates and races, these preferences are made known and are believed to carry 
signifoant weight. BIPAC exchanges information with such notable organizations as the Chamber 
of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Association of Realtors,
the AMA, and the Republican Party.22 similar leadership roles are assumed by the AFL-CIO's
COPE for labor and the Chamber of Commerce for trade assodattons.23 The National Association 
of Business PAC (NABPAC) is a trade association of business PACs that advises and consults with
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its 225 member PACs on PAC strategy and PAC regulations, and even provides candidate
evaluations. NABPAC's slogan is, "Democracy is not a spectator sport."24 Among idealogical, 
nonconnected PACs, the New Right has sought to create a working coalition of interests. The 
Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress monitors activities of a variety of interests and 
PACs and has sought to assist each group achieve maximum effectiveness among its particular
constituency and sphere of influence.25 in addition to information, PACs may transfer funds. 
Coordination of activity is facilitated by considerable overlapping membership that exist among 
some PACs. A restraint on coordination, however, is the divergence of interests and objectives 
of these PACs. Further, PACs that fail to preserve their autonomy may be declared affiliated and
thereby subjected to the contribution limits of a single PAC.26
As an organizational unit, PACs are remarkably simplistic. Federal statutes require only 
that a Pac have a treasurer and "statement of organization’ filed with the FEC within ten days of
its creation.27 PACs generally formulate written by-laws that outlining the selection and 
authority of the governing body of the PAC. Frank J. Sorauf has suggested that authority in the 
PAC reflects structurally the lines of authority of the parent organizations. In assuming the 
administrative expenses of the PAC, the parent organization generally seeks to impose a system 
of governance It deems congenial. Though generalization is difficult, the decision-making body 
of the corporate PAC usually consists of eleven or fewer representatives of middle and upper- 
middle management selected by the corporate CEO or similar corporate offices. The governing 
body of the association PAC is generally chosen by the elected boards or officers of the parent 
organization. Labor PAC leadership is generally elected by the union membership. Sorauf notes 
however that the governing of labor and corporate PACs is more similar than these structural 
arrangements might suggest; that is, there Is a greater degree of centralized authority in labor 
PACs and a lesser degree in corporate PACs. The governing body of the nonconnected PACs is
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ugenerally self-selected and enjoys highly centralized authority.28
This governing body, or the alteration committee it creates, is responsible for 
distribution of PAC funds. One exception adopted by some PACs deserves mention. Earmarking 
is a practice by which contributors designate the recipients of their donations. The donations 
are then forwarded to candidates by the PAC, which hopes to receive at least partial credit for its 
efforts. Earmarking is opposed by many PAC representatives, however, who believe that it 
denies the collective purpose of the PAC and that it may place the PAC in the awkward situation
of transmitting a contribution to a candidate it opposes.29 Evidence suggests that earmarking is 
not heavily relied upon by PACs. A 1982 survey of 399 multicandidate committees by Larry 
Sabato found that 37 percent permitted earmarking, but only 4 percent of those contributing to
these PACs elected to earmark their contributions.30
PACs vary considerably in their objectives, resources, political sophistication and 
political context In which they operate. As a consequence, the range of methods and tactics 
adopted by PACs is extensive. The primary modus operandi of PACs Is direct contributions to
candidates^1 Some PACs also pursue other avenues. Sabato's survey of 399 PACs found 18
percent reported in-kind contributions, that is, contributions of goods and services.32
Independent expenditures, those made without consultation with, or cooperation of, any 
candidate or campaign, are without limit as a consequence of the Supreme Court's landmark 
decision in Bucklev v. Valeo (1976) in which the Court held, inter alia, that legislated limits 
were an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment right of freedom of expression. 
This lack of restriction and the lack of accountability inherent in independent expenditures raise 
serious concerns. Few PACs rely on this method, however. Those that do are most often 
nonconnected ideological PACs and a small number of trade association PACs. The most notable 
use of independent expenditures was by the National Conservative Political Action Committee
•»
(NCPAC) In targetting liberal Democratic Senators for defeat in the 1980 election. Its use of 
such expenditures for negative campaigning was the subject of much controversy, and created 
concern over the effect of independent expenditures on the character of elections, an issue that 
will be addressed later.
These alternatives to direct contributions are often the most effective means of 
pursuing the tactics they often adopt. Ideological PACs with the requisite resources and 
sophistication often seek to influence the quality of the candidates running by providing 
recruitment and training programs, influence the quality of campaigns by providing 
consultants, and influence the campaign issue environment by making independent expenditures
to introduce into the campaign issues dear to them that might not otherwise be addressed.33 The 
"developmental" theory of PACs hypothesizes that as PACs grow in sophistication they will 
engage in a wider range of activities, among them these in-kind contributions and independent 
expenditures.
With this presentation of data and cursory examination of PAC operation, analysis of the 
impact of political action committees on congressional elections and their influence on the 
legislative process is now posssible.
Impact on Congressional Elections
A number of Issues surround the role of PACs In congressional elections. This section 
will address seven of them: the effect of PACs on electoral competition, the corporate-labor 
balance of power, the Democratic-Republican balance of power, the political parties 
themselves, citizen participation, contributor accountability, and the character of elections.
15
Electoral Competition
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Examination of the allocation patterns of PACs reveals a pronounced preference for 
incumbents. As presented in Table 6, 68.9 percent of ail PAG monies in the 1985-1986 
election cycle went to incumbents, 14.2 percent to challengers, and 16.9 percent to open seat 
races. Common Cause, a self-styled public interest lobby, released a study showing that one- 
third of all PACs (1,426 of 4,157) each contributed over 80 percent of its funds to incumbents
in 1986.34 (The reasons for this incumbent preference will be addressed at length in a later 
section.) Given this preference, many have suggested that PACs are responsible for a decrease 
in electoral competition.
A number of observations should be made. First, electoral competition is exacerbated by 
a situation unrelated to the PAC presence- the advantages of incumbency. Incumbents enjoy 
free media access and government subsidized travel and communications, the value of which has
been estimated to approach one million dollars per House election 35 Second, an examination of 
reelection rates historically reveals that electoral competition has not in fact declined. During 
the 1960s, 90 percent of incumbents in the Senate seeking reelection were victorious. The 
reelection rate has sinc(; decreased to 78 percent, and for four recent elections, to 64 percent. 
On the House side, incumbent reelection rates have remained relatively constant for the past 30 
years at approximately 92 percent, and the proportion of marginal victories has remained 
stable since a pronounced decrease in the mid-1960s. Vet at the same time the perquisites of 
office have grown substantially and incumbent offices have become increasingly serviee-
oriented.36
Given these reelection rates, the percentage of PAC funds contributed to incur* its  may 
seem less disturbing, indeed it may suggest a certain degree of political sophistication and
willingness to assume a certain degree of risk.37 Political scientist and noted PAC observer
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Michael Malbin has warned that FEC data revealing PAC contributions to incumbents, 
challengers, and open seat races is useful, but should not be misconstrued. Such figures do not 
reflect the competitiveness of the race nor the percentage allocated to candidates in such races 
many challengers are not viable contenders to entrenched incumbents, making contributions to 
them unwise, even when account is made of the fact that it is those contributions that make a
challenger viable.38 incumbents gam#r a disproportionate share of contributions from ail 
sources, individuals as well as PACs, in part as a consequence of this recurring lack of 
challenger viability.3 9
Research on the value ot challenger funding and of incumbent funding suggests the 
position of the challenger vis-a-vis the incumbent may not be as poor as it appears, and may 
mitigate the effect of PACs' aggregate preference for incumbents. Gary Jacobson has shown by 
multiple regression analysis that campaign expenditures by nonincumbents exert a significant 
impact on the share of votes garnered, whereas incumbent expenditures exert little. That is, the 
marginal returns on expenditures are much greater for challengers than for incumbents. As a 
result, any increase in contributions to both challengers and incumbents will advantage the
challenger, even if the incumbent receives the greater absolute increase.“fO The infusion of PAC 
money into elections may therefore have some pro-competitive effects.
The timing of PAC contributions has also been alleged to decrease electoral competition. 
PACs generally are reluctant to fund challengers early, when most risky to do so, depriving 
them of "seed money* necessary to establish viable candidacies. While this has the effect of 
lessening competition, it may be somewhat offset by PAC propensities to channel significant 
sums of money to strong challengers late in the campaign, when it is often difficult to generate
additional campaign funds.41 It has been suggested that PAC contributions will be made earlier
as PACs become more refined in the process of selection of candidates it wishes to support.4^
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Sorauf found that 45.7 percent of all contributions made in the 1981-1982 election cycle were 
given by June 30 of the second year. Though largely the product of the availability of PAC funds, 
he hypothesized an increase in this figure in accordance with the 'developmental* theory of 
PACs: that PAC maturity gives rise to increased risk-taking, confidence, and political
sophistication.43 Calculations from F-’C data reveal that 56.3 percent of all contributions made 
in the 1985-1986 election cycle were given by June 30, substantiating Sorauf's prediction. It 
may be that with further PAC development, timing of contributions will be less of an Issue for 
electoral competition.
Michael Maibin has found that contributions to challengers are allocated more efficiently 
than contributions to incumbents. Specifically, he found that when account is taken of the 
competitiveness of the race, most nonincumbent contributions are concentrated in close races,
while incumbent contributions are distributed more broadly.44
Theodore Eismeier and Philip Pollock devised a logarithmic model to estimate the 
elasticity of budget size against a variety of dependent variables. They found that with increases 
in budget size, the degree of challenger and open seat spending increased at a rate significantly 
greater than the degree of incumbent spending. Growth in individual PAC budgets may therefore
increase electoral competition.45
In sum, the evkienca presented on the greater value of challenger funding and the greater 
efficiency of challenger contributions greatly reduces the significance of the incumbent 
preference of PACs for electoral competition. Further, it may be the case that the continued 
growth and development of PACs will in some ways enhance competition.
Corporate-labor Balance of Power
The distinction between business and labor represents a traditional economic cleavage in
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our society, and in some respects represents a pivotal focus of power relationships in our 
system. For this reason concern has been raised over disruption of the balance of power 
between them.
As was discussed earlier, labor pioneered the field of political action committees, 
establishing PACs as early as the 1940s. Only by the 1960s did corporations and associations 
respond to labor's initiatives. Since that time labor's position on a number of indicators has 
declined steadily. As presented in Table 1, labor posessed 201 PACs in 1974, representing 33 
percent of all PACs in existence, but only 384, or 9 percent of the total, in 1986. Corporations 
on the other hand had only 89 PACs in 1974, representing 15 percent of all PACs, but 1744, or 
42 percent of the total, in 1986. The 1986 figures reveal an advantage of corporate PACs over 
labor of 4.5:1. Furthermore, PAC contributions by labor, representing one-half of all PAC 
contributions in 1974, have steadily declined, relatively, to the point that they now constitute 
just 23 percent of all contributions, while corporate PACs represent 35 percent and 
trade/membership/health PACs 25 percent. This indicator, more significant that the preceding 
one, reveals corporate's advantage to more modest than its total number of PACs would suggest, 
but nonetheless quite significant.
The disparity is intensified when future development patterns are considered. It is 
generally conceded that the number of labor PACs has stabilized and cannot increase 
significantly. Edwin Epstein, noted observer of corporate PACs, has stated, on the other hand, 
that the market for potential corporate PAC formations is virtually untapped and that many
existing corporate PACs have the capacity for growth and expansion.46
Certain factors mitigate the perceived magnitude of this imbalance. While corporations 
have more PACs to their name, labor enjoys a greater membership base, a base it can access in 
two ways. As cited earlier, the provision of FECA providing for the creation of the separate
segregated fund also provides for two other exceptions to the prohibition of the use of labor and 
corporate treasury funds for political purposes. The first is nonpartisan voter registration and 
get-out-the-vote drives which, though ostensibly nonpartisan, are directed so as to advantage 
the sponsoring agent. Because these expenditures are not reported to the Federal Elections 
Commission it is impossible to accurately gauge the extent of this activity, but it is clear that 
labor far and away makes more extensive use of this provision. The second is internal 
communications, permitted between unions and their members and families and between 
corporations and their stockholders, executives, and families. These communications may be 
political and partisan, and like voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives, are not subject
to any expenditure limitations.47 Internal communications costing in excess of $2,000 must 
be reported to the FEC. While this fails to capture much of their activity, it is instructive to 
note that greater than 90 percent of the roughly 100 organizations making disclosures to the
FEC during the 1983-1984 election cycle were labor organizations.4® While business also 
engages In internal communications, there is little evidence that business is nearly as skilled or
successful in utilizing these techniques.49
Thus, while labor's relative strength is deteriorating In terms of PAC activity, labor's 
position is substantially ameliorated by advantages it enjoys in other areas of political activity. 
What implications, if any, labor's relative decline has on its legislative influence will be 
examined in a later section.
Partisan Balance
Concern is often expressed that PACs operate to advantage one political party at the 
expense of the other. To the extent that vigorous competition between the parties is desirable, 
an examination is warranted.
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Table 5 reveals that PACs on the whole contributed 56.4 percent of their contributions to 
Democratic candidates in the 1985-1986 election cycle, with the remaining 43.6 percent 
allocated to Republicans. The Democratic advantage is the product of very strong support from 
labor PACs (92.5 percent of their contributions) combined with significant support from 
corporate PACs (38.9 percent) and from trade/membership/health PACs (48.8 percent).
Some observers have asserted, however, that the Democratic advantage is quite 
precarious. First, the categories of PACs that, ceteris paribus, prefer Republican candidates
have grown at a much faster rate than those favoring Democrats.50 Second, much of the support 
provided by most corporate and trade association PACs is given to incumbent Democrats in what 
has been called a marriage of convenience, a marriage that is expected to dissolve if the
Republicans ever gain control of the House.51 It has been suggested that Democratic vs. 
Republican candidate receipts may be misleading since there are more Democratic incumbents 
that Republican incumbents, and as shown earlier, incumbents receive more than challengers 
and open seat candidates. In a comparison of partisan receipts by candidate status for the 1981- 
1982 election cycle, it was found that Republicans generally outpaced Democrats. Republican 
challengers and open seat candidates received substantially more from PACs than Democratic 
challengers and open seat candidates, and, as shown by Jacobson's research, it is in these 
categories that contributions are most effective in Influencing election outcomes. Contributions 
to incumbents, especially safe incumbents, on the other hand, is often wasted, having little
effect on election outcomes.52 it appears, then, that PACs may have advantaged Republicans In 
that election. Examination of the data for the 1985-1966 election cycle, however, generally 
reveals an advantage for the Democrats in those categories of candidates in which contributions 
are the most influential, especially In the House. Table 7 presents PAC contributions by 
candidate status for this cycle.
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Table 7: PAG Contributions bv Candidate Status. 1985-66 fin millions!
Houm ElacMona
Democratic Republican
Incumbent $ 4 2 .2 incumbent $ 2 5 .6
Challenger 6.9 Challenger 2.6
Open Seat 7.0 Open Seat 5.2
Total 56.1 Total 33.4
Senate Elections
Democratic Republican
Incumbent $9.8 Incumbent $ 1 8 .6
Challenger 8.0 Challenger 2.3
Open Seat 4.8 Open Seat 6.5
Total 22.6 Total 27.4
Source: FEC data.52
Table 7 reveals that Democratic candidate receipts surpassed Republican candidate 
receipts In (Our of the six categories, and, more importantly, in three of the four nonincumbent 
categories, where funding is most influential.
It may be the case, then, that the partisan balance of power, as far as PACs are 
concerned, Is largely the function of the political environment of each election. For example, 
the levels of support generated by Republican candidates for the Senate In the last election cycle 
may have reflected the position Republicans were in to challenge Democratic control of the 
Senate, efforts that were ultimately unsuccessful.
PACs and the Political Parties
PACs have often been alleged to contribute substantially to the deterioration of the 
political parties, the traditional source of coalition formation and political responsibility. Fred 
Wertheimer of Common Cause has asserted that PACs substantially weaken an already anemic
political party system and challenge party responsibility.53
Most scholars concede, at most, a modest causal relationship between the decline of the 
political parties and the emergence of PACs. The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Political 
Action Committees concluded that the growth of PACs has coincided with the waning of political 
parties and the fragmentation of politics, and is In part responsible tor these trends. It further 
noted, however, that these patterns are the product of transformation in the electorate, in
campaigning, and in society.^4 Sorauf cited three forces contributing to the growth of PACs and 
the withering of parties: *1) a more politicized, better educated electorate, 2) expensive 
campaign technology and industry, and 3) shifting incentives to political action in an affluent
society."55 The electorate, no longer drawn to broad groupings of commitments, now align 
themselves, it is argued, to more narrow and precise commitments, to which PACs are 
Inherently more responsive. Further, the modern media-oriented campaign technologies 
require vast sums of money which PACs are in a better position to provide in comparison to the
political parties, which have historically provided nonmonetary resources to candidates.56 "At
most," Sorauf has concluded, "PACs have only nudged the parties' downward slide."57
While PACs and parties compete for the loyalty of candidates, there Is a significant 
degree of cooperation between them. PACs contribute significant sums to the political parties,
particularly the Democratic Party, which is perennially hard pressed for funds.58 Political 
parties, through the parties' campaign committees, seek to unite their partisans with PACs
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potentially sympathetic to their candidates' causes.59 Both parties' committees distribute 
newsletters to prospective PAC contributors espousing the merits of their candidates, and also
assist their candidates in soliciting PACs.®0
The ties between candidate and political party have been lessened by the availability of 
alternative campaign resources provided by PACs. The competition between PACs and partes, 
however, has been one of many forces stimulating development in party organization,
technology, and fundraising, thereby strengthening candidate-party ties.®1 Political scientists
Ruth Jones and Warren Miller have observed:
There is no reason to believe that the parties are somehow structurally incapable 
of responding to the creative use of the new technologies and competing with the
as yet less well institutionalized candidate organizations and P A C s____Drawing
on the well-established infrastructure of national, state and local party units, 
and utilizing the economies of scale, both parties may be in a position to establish 
fund-raising efforts that will overtake the ad hoc candMate organizations and 
sustain a funding base of active, engaged voters that will undermine the success 
of PACs.®2
Thus it appears that the impact of PACs on the political parties is complex, and not 
simply the case that the former has worked to the detriment of the latter. It also appears that 
the relationship between PACs and the political parties may be evolving.
Citizen Participation
The nature and extent of citizen participation that has resulted from PAC involvement is 
an issue of sharp conflict among proponents and opponents to PACs. PAC advocates assert that 
PACs provide an outlet for greater citizens' and interest groups' participation in the political 
process, allowing for Increased constitutionally-protected political expression for individuals 
and Increased interest group articulation, desirable in a pluralistic society. Detractors, 
however, insist that the increased participation afforded individuals Is minimal, and, further,
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that PAC participation may be the consequence of coercion.
According to political scientist Herbert Alexander, the purpose of campaign finance 
reform has been to redistribute political power by limiting the influence of monied interests
and, in so doing, broadening financial constituencies.*3  Evidence suggests that PACs have indeed 
broadened the base of political participation in financing elections. A survey conducted by the 
University of Michigan's Survey Research Center found in 1980 that a greater percentage of 
individuals reported contributing to a "political action group" than to either a candidate or a 
political party. The affirmative response rates were 6.7 percent, 5.9 percent, and 3.6 percent,
respectively.64 These figures have been criticized as potentially inflated due to a tendency to 
overreport political involvement by respondents and due to the questions themselves, which may
have invited overreporting.65
Further evidence on the broadening of financial constituencies can be inferred from the 
limited data suggesting that PACs receive their funds from small donations. Sabato's 1982 
survey of 399 multicandidate PACs found the median donation to be $100, with PACs receiving 
donations from 400 individuals at a response rate of 25 percent. These figures varied 
considerably across categories, however. While corporate and labor PACs enjoyed comparable 
response rates, corporate PACs received a median donation of $160 from 155 donors, while
labor PACs received a median donation of $14 from 2,700 donors.66 The data suggests that a 
very substantial number of individuals are involved in the process when the magnitude of total 
PAC receipts is considered.
Jones and Miller analyzed National Elections Studies' survey data compiled from the 
1980 election. They concluded that the new modes of contributing have expanded the base of 
individual contributors. In studying the nature of this participation, however, they found that 
PAC contributors were only marginally more involved in politics than the national average and
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as a group were least likely to engage in traditional campaign activities.^? This suggests that 
while PACs have resulted in increased political participation In terms of financing campaigns, 
the extent of this increase in participation may be limited. Epstein has hypothesized that with 
the increased development and maturity of corporate PACs, there will be an increased effort to 
augment individual political participation in the corporate sector, emulating the successes of 
labor. He has suggested that a more extensive and comprehensive electoral involvement by
members of the corporate community could result.68
Some are critical of this new participation, alleging that it is often coerced. Coercion is 
most often alleged among corporate PACs, where solicitors generally possess salary aiid 
promotion sanctions, creating potential Implicit pressure to donate. Sabato found that some 
PACs do contact employees who have declined to donate by letter, expressing the PAC solicitors'
disappointment and requesting these employees to reconsider.69 Most corporate PACs, however 
go to great lengths to stress the voluntary nature of the contribution and to prevent even the
appearance of undue pressures to contribute.?!)
Coercion Is difficult to define and equally difficult to demonstrate (or refute). It should 
be noted that the Federal Elections Commission has never ruled a solicitation practice coercive. 
Further, there Is no suggestion that coercion is widespread or systematic, an assertion that
wouid be inconsistent with contribution rates below 30 percent.?!
Thus PACs have increased citizen participation in the political process, though there is 
some evidence that at the present the extent of this increase is for the most part strictly 
financial. Coercion in this participation, if it exists, is quite rare and has yet to be established.
Internal Accountability
The relationship of PAC leadership to its contributors is not directly telavant to
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congressional elections, but is significant in that to the extent that PAC allocation decisions
reflect or are consistent w*th contributor sentiments, PACs are desirable, and to the extent that
they do not or are inconsistent, PACs role in the political process is undesirable. Mechanisms of
accountability are the primary means by which congruence between allocation decisions and
contributor sentiments can be ensured
Lacking accountability, group leadership may depart from its membership.
According to Representative Jim Leach (R-IA):
Groups seldom reflect the same collective judgment as all their members. More 
importantly, decisions for organizations frequently occur at the top not the 
bottom, and the abdication of local control over funds leads to the aggrandizement 
of leadership power . . . .  [The leadership] views, not the small contributors to 
their association, become the views that carry influence7 2
While this contention may be difficult to verify, it does raise a legitimate concern.
There are no formal mechanisms of accountability within PACs. Contributors rarely
participate in PAC governance. As discussed earlier, the governing bodies of connected PACs are
generally selected by the leadership of their parent organizations. Only labor generally allows
for election of PAC officers by its membership. The governing bodies of nonconnected PACs are
self-selected and enjoy tremendous centralized authority. The governing bodies of PACs, or the
allocation committees they create, are responsible for distribution of PAC funds, free,
generally, of formal contributor interference.
PACs are dependent on two sources for funds: donors and (for connected PACs) the parent
organization. These two sources constitute the vehicles for PAC accountability.
Donors may exercise authority by two means: ’Voice'' and "exit". Format voice is
achieved only through the aforementioned practice of earmarking, which allows the donor to
designate the recipient of his contribution. As noted, however, earmarking does not enjoy
widespread acceptance and use, and is not, consequently, a major source of accountability-
Informal voice, on the other hand, is quite prevalent. Most PACs actively solicit donor 
recommendations, and allocation criteria often afford preference to donor-sponsored
candidates.73 Bernadette Budde, BIPAC's director of political education and noted observer of 
business PACs, insists that contributors to PACs exert substantial influence over allocation 
decisions made by the committee or board responsible for them: in corporate PACs (and 
perhaps local unions), individual contributors and PAC decision makers maintain on going
working relationships which allow for substantial ’ upward* feedback.74 PAC representatives 
and PAC observers concur that only a small minority of PACs will support a candidate against
the wishes of local contributions.75 Political scientist John Wright has contended that PACs arc 
substantially constrained by the organization of its fundraising activities, characterized by
dependence on local PAC activists.76
In addition to ’voice*, donors may exercise their authority through ’exit’ , by declining tc 
contribute in the future. This may be a potent weapon If PAC leadership flagrantly diverges 
from responsible conduct, but it has been suggested that the effectiveness of exit may be often 
limited. Donors, it is argued, are drawn to the PAC through a commonality of interests shared 
by donor, PAC, and parent that ultimately binds the donor to the legislative strategy of the PAC, 
and discourages mass exiting, particularly by those donors who contribute for essentially
nonpolitical reasons.7 7
While ’exit’ may not be a potent means of accountability, it Is asserted that 
accountability flows from the parent organization to the PAC. Though often structurally remote 
from the parent, the PAC is ultimately accountable to the parent's officers, and at least 
indirectly, to its members or stockholders. This relationship exists because of the parent's 
sponsorship of the PAC and because it Is the parent that bestows intangfele. nonpolitical benefit:
drawing donors to the PAC, particularly, notions of approval and organizational solidarity.78
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Thus, accountability in the connected PAC stems primarily from informal donor voice anc 
from PAC ties to the parent, and perhaps to a lesser extent, from donor exit. These factors do 
not operate as effectively in nonconnected PACs. The highly centralized authority of the PAC and 
physical remoteness of the donor (often solicited by mass mailings) do not permit significant 
donor voice through upward feedback. The extremely low response rates of nonconnected PACs 
(three percent according to Sabato's survey) substantially weakens the viability of donor exit 
as a means of accountability. Nonconnected PACs, free to solicit the general public, drawing on 
computer-generated direct mail solicitations, are in a much better position to replace donors 
who have exited. Finally, these PACs are in no way constrained by a sponsoring organization. 
Thus, accountability in the nonconnected PACs is virtually nonexistant, permitting a small 
cadre of leadership to allocate resources in support of jssues to which very few contributors 
are aware or themselves support. This becomes particularly problematic when nonconnected 
PACs engage in independent expenditures, as they have shown a propensity to do, by which they 
can determine the ontry point of funds in the campaign, free of even nominal candidate
accountability.T9
Accountability, then varies with the type of PAC and with the type of financial activity of 
the PAC. Sorauf constructed a matrix of accountability incorporating these two dimensions, 
reformulated below.
Table 8: Matrix of Aooountahltltv ter PAC Activity 
(With Sums of Expenditures, 1985-86)
Contribution to Candidates Independent Expenditures
Connected PACS greatest
($113.47 million)
intermediate 
($4.44 million)
Nonconnected intermediate 
($18.71 million)
l68St
($5.07 million)
Source: Frank J. Sorauf, ’Who’s in Charge? Aeeountability in Political Action Committees,* 
Political Science Quarterly 1C (Winter 1984-85), p. 613.
Calculated using FEC data.80
The matrix reveals that the mode ot PAC activity providing the greatest level of accountability 
greatly exceeds all other categories.
PACs, then, do not provide in their structural arrangements substantial avenues of 
accountability, particularly in comparison to their organization competitors, the political 
parties, in which there is legislated access to party decision making and electoral accountability 
on the ballot. Accountability doeu exist, primarily for connected PACs, through less formal 
means; namely, donor voice, donor exit, and parent ties, and ultimately, for direct 
contributions, candidate responsibility. The adequacy of these means, however, may be 
compromised If, as the research by Jones and Miller suggests, PAC contributors are politically 
disengaged.
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Character of Elections
PACs have been alleged to adversely affect the character of congressional elections 
through their use of constitutionally protected independent expenditures that are negative. The 
criticism stems primarily from the aggressive use of negative campaigning by the National 
Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) of the New Right, and its boisterous leader 
John T. ’Terry" Dolan, to target liberal Democratic Senators in the 1980 election. The 
successes credited to NCPAC in that election, in addition to prompting the creation of a number ol 
Ideologically liberal PACs In the 1982 election, including the Progressive Political Action
Committee (PROPAC), Democrats for the '80s, and Independent Action,61 encouraged adoption ol 
negative campaigning to the extent that 80 percent of all Independent expenditures In 1982 were
negative.62 NCPAC's tactics were made a campaign issue in that election by targeted liberals, 
and NCPAC's effectiveness was drastically compromised. In the 1983-1984 election cycle, only
44.2 percent of all Independent expenditures directed at congressional races was negative.83 in 
the 1985-1986 cycle, only 14.4 percent of PAC independent expenditures was devoted to 
advocate the defeat of candidates, while the remainder was devoted to advocate the election of
specific candidates.84
Thus, while the unrestricted nature of independent expenditures, as woll as their 
inherent lack of accountability to candidates and voters, nru'y potentially pose a threat to 
congressional elections, the character of elections has not been adversely affected. As noted by 
Jacobson, ’ independent PAC spending is more important for what it portends for the future than
for any consequence it has had so far."85
Analysis of the impact of PACs on congressional elections, and on citizen Involvement as a 
consequence, reveals the relation to be quite complex. The observed incumbent bias of PACs may 
not be as detrimental to electoral competition as some perceive. Labor PACs have indeed 
experienced a decline in strength vis-a-vis corporate PACs despite steady and substantial 
growth in absolute terms, but labor has retained significant advantages that compensate for this 
decline. Despite their role as institutional competitors, PACs have had only a modest impact on 
the political parties. PACs' impact on partisan balance is similarly slight, and it appears that 
levels of PAC support as a whole tend to reflect the variable conditions of the political climate. 
Finally, PACs have brought more Individuals into the political process, though the extent of this 
participation may be somewhat limited.
Influence of PACs on the Laoislatlve Process 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect surrounding the role of PACs in the political 
system is Its Impact on the legislative process, and, more specifically, incumbent legislative
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behavior. Critics argue that PACs, through their infusion of vast quantities of political funds 
into the system, allow their special interests to gain disproportionate influence in the process. 
There is concern that incumbents, through their increasing dependence on PACs, may become 
beholden to special Interests to the extent that they foresake the public or national interest.
This section examines the motivations of PACs in influencing the legislative process, 
whether it is access, L &  securing amicable relations with incumbents, or ’votebuying*, La* 
adjusting incumbent legislative behavior. It will examine the consequences of PAC activity on 
the legislative process; specifically, the impact of special interest access on representation, the 
nature and extent of PAC influence on incumbent voting, and whether, as some critics allege, 
PACs have paralyzed the policy-making process.
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The access theory holds that PACs contribute to incumbents to establish or maintain 
communication channels between incumbent and interest group representative so that the 
representative is afforded the opportunity to present his or her interest's position. Access 
theory presupposes that PACs are motivated to do more than influence election outcomes, their 
ostensible raison d'etre. That is, by seeking to foster amicable ties with incumbents, PACs are 
not simply supporting candidates already positively predisposed to their interests (or opposing 
candidates negatively predisposed).
There Is considerable circumstantial evidence to suggest that PACs are motivated to 
achieve aocess. First and foremost, it has been observed that there exists some degree of linkage 
between PAC campaign finance and lobbying efforts, principally, for connected PACs, those 
affiliated with a parent organization. The degree of coordination or integration is much disputed 
Wertheimer has alleged that ’contributions often play a major role In overall lobbying
strategies.'86 Malb, has contended that association lobbying organizations often work closely 
with their PACs and that (or structural reasons associations may coordinate legislative and
electoral strategies more effectively than corporations.87 Budde has observed, however, that 
while the parent organizations of labor PACs often have powerful lobbying arms, labor PACs by 
their contribution patterns seem more interested in influencing elections, an electoral function
than i.i influencing incumbent voting, a lobbying function.88 Sorauf has noted, more generally, 
that linkage is the product of the commonality of political aspirations, and that there is 
significant autonomy existing between PAC and sponsor. While shar..,g political goals, PACs 
maintain predominantly independent identities and generally work without external
interference.89 Thus, while it is clear that PAC and lobbying activites are not fully 
coordinated, it is apparent that some degree of linkage exists. This structural arrangen * 
intuitively suggests that PACs are desirous, at a minimum, of securing access.
Motivation can also be inferred from examination of certain allocative proclivities of 
PACs. A PAC seeking to maximize its partisan or ideological cohort in Congress might adopt the 
strategy of funding preferred candidates in competitive elections in which the marginal effects 
of that funding are most likely to influence the election outcome. Contributions to sale 
incumbents, who face no real election challenge, depart from this rational strategy and suggest a
legislative motive.90 Note that this evidence Is only circumstantial. An aHemadve hypedwsis 
might be that the PAC, rather than seeking access to incumbents, may be motivated to provide a 
sympathetic incumbent ‘ intimidation money' early in the election cycle to ward off viable 
challengers in future elections. The sufficiency of this contention as an explanation for a 
significant portion of this behavior, however, is suspect. Second, research has demonstrated 
that at least some PACs concentrate funding to members of committees with jurisdiction over
relevant policy interests.91 One study found members of House Ways and Means and the House
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Commerce Committees, committees with extensive jurisdiction over a host of policy areas 
relevant to organized interests, received PAC funds totaling twice those received by members of
House Judiciary and Foreign Affairs Committees.92 Note that this evidence is correlational, 
establishing only a presumption of a legislative motive.
The circumstantial evidence presented that PACs pursue access is buttressed by the 
anecdotal accounts of PAC representatives, and the more scholarly accounts of knowledgeable
observers. The consensus is clearly that a great many PACs are desirous of (at least) access.93 
Budde has no qualms in conceding a strong relationship between the presence of PACs i i an 
industry and the level of government regulation of that industry. She has stated that as 
government moves nearer to creating a partnership with an industry "the result of that liaison
is a PAC, mothered by industry but unmistakably sired by government *94 Sorauf has asserted 
that PACs, especially those with parent organizations, who often have legislative interests in 
Washington, seek net to have their interests compromised and their contact relations strained, 
mid therefore pursue a strategy of risk avoidance to conooNdatt influence already achieved. The 
chief determinant, Soraut argues, influencing compromise between a 'pragm atic', incwntbent- 
orienfod and ideological, more challenger-oriented legislative strategy is the extent to which 
acllei i ao of the PAG ate Intsgrafsd Into t ie  adMNas of the parent orgmiaMion's fopMahva 
representatives, who seek, Inter aha, to praaatve aadadbfo Mas w ih  m cw hents and who a rt
often importuned ay members to H an d  fundraising avents in Washingfon.MS Eismaier anal 
Pollock, cenalstent with Soraufs assertion, found a pronounced effect on the praaanra of a 
Washington eftce on PAC allocative behavior. Their data, using their mudaf previously chad, 
revealed that with increasing budget size, the number of donees increased rapidly while the size 
ot contributions decreased, suggesting either that PACs seek to maximize access opportunit es oi
that Washington PACs face more claimants.9® They concluded that Washington-based PACs,
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those presumably linked to a greater extent to lobbying efforts, tend generally to be more
pragmatic (incumbent-oriented) and access-oriented.97 Sorauf, further, has attributed the 
more challenger-oriented strategies of nonconnected PACs (evidenced in Table 6) to the fact tha 
many of these PACs, especially ideological PACs. are zealously committed to ideological purity. 
They are often uncontent with the status quo and less inclined to maintain amicable relations
with unfavored incumbenfs98 This style has been termed "entrepreneurial*, in contrast to the
"participatory* style of connected PACs.99 Thus, the evidence and analysis presented clearly 
support the prevailing wisdom that at least a significant portion of PACs are motivated, at a 
minimum, to secure access.
PAC representatives, observers, and members of Congress generally concede that PACs 
obtain some degree of access. It Is clear that PAC contributions in no way guarantee access, and 
that other factors, such as the PAC's ability to mobilize constituent support (or opposition), 
may be what provides access for the PAC. But Sabato has noted: "no cne seriously disputes that 
access, for those organization which desire it, is sometimes secured hy means of campaign
cash."tOO The debate is over the desirability of this practice.
One argument ooneems the tendency of PACs to nationalize campaign finance. David 
Adamany hae allaged that, beeauee PACs amass funds from individual small contributors 
throughout the country and centralize those funds into PAC leadership responsible for 
distribution, the oenstituency represented by these funds is in effect me PAC and its leadership, 
and It is this constituency to whiah preferred aecess if given, which may represent a competing
interest to local constituent interests.'*01 The nationalization of political campaigns has, 
according to Representative Leach, created a breakdown in citizen access. As he puts it, a 
constituent will get in the door, but the contributor will get in the door first. This results, he 
argues, in a malfunction in constitutional democracy which is based on citizen access and
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constituency access.102 Alexander has countered asserting that to the extent that national 
representatives are engaged in national policy making, a certain degree of nationalization of
finance is both Inevitable and desirable.1 °3 Jacobson has observed:
Members are inclined to assume . . .  that they should be beholden to no one but 
their own constituents, that representation should be stricly territorial.
Although dated as political theory, It is easy to understand the appeal of this view 
to members whose political careers rest on diligent personal cultivation of 
constituencies. A career strategy of this sort crucially depends on maintaining 
autonomy, the freedom to maneuver as an independent politicr 1 
entrepreneur.104
Autonomy is compromised to the extent that funding from national sources tends to introduce 
national issues into the campaign. Thus the access afforded contributors as a consequence of the 
nationalization of funding may be of some benefit.
PAC advocates assert that contributions are not the primary factor determining 
allocation of access. PACs compete with party leaders, press lobbyists, staff and constituent 
representatives for the legislator's time and attention. Contribution patterns are only one
factor that may be considered In the incumbent's allocation decisions.1 °5  it has been noted that 
other "irrelevant'' criteria influence these decisions, such as family connections and celebrity
status.100
While there is often considerable competition between and among interests for incumben 
access, it is clear that access is not available to all, and it is conceivable that some interests, 
particularly those not represented by PAC funding, may be disadvantaged to some extent. Critic 
are also fearful of the appearance of corruption and the loss of public approbation It engenders, 
though this is not facile to demonstrate. The potential harm of these contentions is considerably 
mitigated, however, by the fact that contributions that seek to secure access are intended by 
definition only to afford Interest group representatives the opportunity to state their case. They 
seek to Influence Incumbent legislative behavior by the merits of their position or cause, not by
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their financial commitment.
Votebuylna
Votebuying refers to an incumbent's conscious adjustment of legislative behavior in 
response to the financial overtures of a PAC made for that purpose. The practice is termed 
votebuying because the most visible manifestations of behavioral adjustment are alterations in 
voting patterns, and consequently, are the most amenable to study.
The motivations of PACs are, as previously stated, much disputed. The strongest critics 
of PACs have called PAC activity institutionalized bribery. PAC advocates vehemently object, 
insisting PAC funds are distributed to candidates on the basis of the incumbent's preheld views 
and a shared conception of what constitutes good public policy. Others do not agree. As Senator 
Robert Dole (R-KS) has commented, "When these political action committees give money, they
expect something in return other than good government."f 07
An examination of certain PAC allocation patterns may be instructive. According to 
Sabato, one not uncommon practice, most prevalent among labor and trade PACs, is the 
distribution of ‘ reward money", contributions provided with the Intent to reward incumbems 
who have demonstrated favorable voting patterns. Sabato cites three instances In support of this 
contention. One account found a pronounced effect of congressional support for the measure 
establishing the Department of Education in 1979 on National Education Association PAC 
contributions in 198C. A second account related congressional support for certain housing 
legislation to the Realtor's PACs contributions. A third account asserted sponsors of Medicredit,
backed by the AMA, received "thank you" money from AMPAC.106 The practice of offering 
reward money does not necessarily Imply PACs are motivated to buy votes, but suggests they are 
not insensitive to voting records in allocating support Sabato found in his survey that PACs
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generally deny giving reward money, but that PAC representatives believe that rewarding those 
who independently cast favorable votes prior to them receiving contributions is more wholesome
than seeking to buy votes in the future. 109
A similar though allegedly less common practice is the distribution of "punish money", 
contributions withheld or provided to opponents with the Intent to punish an incumbent for an 
unfavorable voting record. Sabato observed that while punish money may represent a potent
weapon, PAC animosity is often ephemeral.110 After & period of time, PACs generally convey 
financial overtures to incumbents to whom they have expressed hostility (suggesting that they 
are desirous of renewed access).
A third practice suggesting at least that PACs are sensitive to congressional voting
patterns Is the use by some of "report cards" on key votes to determine PAC allocatlons.111 
While the effect of this practice and the two preceding may be to adjust incumbent behavior, 
they are only suggestive of PAC motivations.
Other PAC practices are more revealing. PACs on occasion threaten retribution In 
efforts to defeat unfavored legislation. According to one account, BIPAC and others made known 
that support for certain campaign finance reforms would result In dramatic decreases In
business PAC support.112 These threatened consequences, however, failed to m aterlalize.H3  
This technique clearly represents an attempt to "buy votes". Another practice strongly 
evidencing this motivation Is the timing of contributions to coincide with crucial moments in the 
legislative, not electoral, cycle. Though perhaps not common, the evidence is overwhelming that 
this on occasion occurs. PAC representatives generally allege that such timing is merely 
coincidental; the evidence would suggest otherwise, in many circumstances such contributions 
are refused by Incumbents, perhaps one explanation why this practice Is believed not to be
widely u s e d .m
It can thus be concluded that PACs often condition support on legislative behavior, and In 
so doing seek to Influence such behavior, if only indirectly. It is quite conceivable that there are 
even explicit attempts to "buy votes" in a quid pro quo fashion, though undoubtedly conveyed in a 
relatively subtle manner. Given this motivation, it becomes necessary to assess the success of 
PACs In these efforts.
A number of studies have been conducted to ascertain the effect of PAC contributions on 
incumbent voting. Common Cause and a host of journalists have attempted to relate PAC 
contributions and incumbent roll call voting by revealing the contributions received by those 
who voted a particular way. While the relationship purportedly shown is often quite strong, the 
evidence is only correlational, falling to demonstrate causation. A number of considerations are 
weighed by the incumbent in casting his vote, only one among them calculations of future 
campaign support. Further, these studies fail to demonstrate the direction of the relation: 
whether PACs support sympathetic Incumbents for their past voting record or whether PACs 
contribute to nonsympathetic incumbents to Influence their future voting record.
A number of scholars have employed sophisticated statistical techniques to determine the 
effect of PAC contributions independent of other variables such as Ideology, party, and prior 
voting record. W. P. Welch examined the effect on voting for dairy price supports exerted by 
dairy PAC contributions In the preceding year. He found a detectable but relatively small effect. 
Much stronger predictors of voting were the significance of dairy production in the district and 
the Ideology and partisan affiliation of the incumbent. A significant relation was found, however 
between Incumbent voting and dairy PAC contributions In the subsequent election (so-called
"reward m oney").115
Henry Chappell examined the effects of PAC gifts on seven congressional vots. He 
discerned a significant effect on voting exerted by prior election PAC contributions in only one
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instance (contributions by Rockwell International on voting on the B-1 Bomber).116 In a 
similar fashion Diana Yiannakis examined the effect of PAC contributions made In the previous 
election on voting for the Chrysler loan guarantee and for a windfall profits oil tax. She found a 
very limited but discernible effect. The effect was overshadowed, however, by the ideology and
partisan affiliation of the incumbent.117 Similar conclusions were reached by Candice Nelson 
and by James Kau and Paul Rubin In studies examining a large number of bills. They found
Incumbent ideological predisposition to be the strongest predictor r f  voting. 1 1 8
These studies found only a very limited effect of contributions on voting. Generally, the 
bills examined In these studies were high visibility Issues or wero relatively divided along 
Ideological or partisan lines. Kirk Brown examined the effects of contributions by the National 
Automobile Dealers' Association PAC on a less visible issue-the House vote to veto a FTC 
regulation requiring used-cars dealers to list all known automobile defects to consumers. 
NADAPAC contributed to 242 of the 286 House incumbents who supported the veto prior to the 
vote. W lille this correlation is merely suggestive, a positive relationship between contributions 
and voting was found even after Ideological and partisan variables were contioiled, particularly 
for those whose ideological leanings were significantly more conservative or liberal than NADA.
Further, a relationship between the vote and subsequent NADAPAC contributions was found.119 
Similarly, John Frendreis and Richard Waterman examined the effects of contributions 
from the American Transportation Association and party, ideology, and constituency variables on 
a Senate vote for trucking deregulation. ATAPAC contributed to 54 senators in the preceding 
election. The effect of these contributions was strongest for those up for reelection the earliest; 
Indeed It was a stronger predictor of voting behavior than any of the other variables. The 
researchers concluded:
Votes are linked so strongly to PAC contributions on this Issue precisely because
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other forces are not operating as strongly as they normally do. Trucking 
deregulation In 1980 was not a clearly partisan or Ideological issue, and :or most 
Senators it was difficult for them to calculate the issue's relevance to their 
constituencies. In sum, the forces that normally structure legislative voting 
only slightly predisposed Senators in one direction or the other in this case.120
Other research casts a degree of doubt on the aforementioned findings. John Wright
examined the effect of contributions of five national association PACs, presumed influential due
to their size and allegedly strong degree of linkage with parent lobbying organizations, on the
issue believed most important to each in the Ninety-Seventh Congress. Analysis of a variety of
possible predictor variables revealed that In no case was a contribution significant enough to
alter a vote from how it would have been cast had no contribution been made.121
Welch found PAC contributions to be influenced more by overall voting records than by
specific legislative Issues.122 Dickinson McGaw and Richard McCleary found contributions by 
PACs interested In significant committee votes on the Davls-Bacon Act were made at crucial
points in the electoral, not legislative cycle.123 Eismeler and Pollock found PAC allocation
strategies quite unsophisticated. They concluded:
'nstead ot targeting their resources for maximum legislative effect (for example, 
giving to a member of Congress who is uncommitted on the PAC's favored bill), 
political action committees tend to reward the best behavior on congressman who 
were positively predisposed toward the interest group's legislation to begin with.
This is the crudest and least effective of all 'exchange' theories.124
In other research, J. David Gopolan concluded that the allocation strategies employed by
PACs did not maximize either access or power.120
The statistical models used by the researchers have a number of shortcomings that may 
Influence the perceived effect of PAC contributions on Incumbent voting. The first to be noted is 
that they reveal only statistical probabilities of causation. While not conclusive, however, they 
are far superior indicators of behavioral influence than correlational studies, and indeed the 
inference some research established that contributions affect policymaking is compelling, it
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may also be that the effect of PAC contributions is understated (or overstated) in these studies 
because they only examine roll call voting. As Wright has noted, analysis of roll call votes 
provides only a rough indicator of the influence that might be exerted by PAC contributions on 
legislative outcomes; tho gislatlve process may be Influenced at other stages and in other 
ways, such as influencing decisions to report bills out of committee or influencing strategic
considerations in scheduling. 126 if the effect of PAC contributions is indeed augmented by a 
lack cf public scrutiny, their effect may be greater in the formative stages of legislation than 
the analysis of roll-call voting suggests. Finally, these studies may overstate the effect of PAC 
contributions by confounding their effect with that of the lobbying efforts of the parent 
organization and that of the grass roots organization. These factors generally act in harmony, if 
not unity, with PAC contributions yet only the effect of contributions is considered, in the case 
of the FTC House veto, for example, NADA enjoyed a powerful lobbying organization and vocal
grass roots support across the country. 127 These caveats must be considered in assessing the 
accuracy of these studies' findings.
The conclusion that flows from these findings is that under certain circumstances PAC 
contributions can have an independent effect on incumbent voting, specifically, on Issues that 
are invisible, specialized and narrow, or unopposed by organized interests. To the extent that 
this is antithetical to democratic principles, It is distressing. Nonetheless PAC legislative 
Influence must be viewed in the proper perspective, in general, partisan and Ideological factors 
are much stronger predictors of incumbent voting. Contributions only exert a significant 
impact when these and other factors normally affecting the incumbent are insubstantial or 
contradictory. Such Is seldom the case on issues of major national Importance.
The intent and effectiveness of PACs should not be overstated. The Irrationality of PAC 
allocative strategies under an influence-maximizing model has been noted. Further, the general
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modesty of the average PAC contribution must be considered. In 1981-82, for example, the 
average PAC contribution was $614, and the average winner received contributions from 102
PACs. 1 28 Contributions are often quite dispersed and an Incumbent is seldom politically 
dependent on any one source. Stephen Harder has argued: "the inconvenience of replacing most 
sinqle contributions cannot weigh heavily in the scales of the legislator's mind when balanced 
against concerns of conscience, credibility, party, ideology, electoral consequences, and
collegial relations."129 At the same time it should be noted that there are Issues on which PACs 
align themselves. In the words of Representative David Obey (D-WI): "The pressure generated 
from those aggregate contributions Is enormous and warps the process. It is as If they had made
a single, extremely large contribution.‘ 130 Such a contribution may be much more difficult to 
dismiss. The frequency of this commonality of interests and objectives, however, has often been 
said to be much less than generally perceived.
As shown in Table 4 all House candidates received an average of 34 percent of their 
campaign receipts from PACs and all Senate candidates 21 percent. Common Cause reported that 
almost half of the House members received SO percent or more of their contributions In the
1986 election.131 This clearly represents a very sizable portion of campaign funds, and 
concern over the influence afforded PACs as a consequence may be well placed. Concerned 
observers assert that it is acceptable for a group to advocate a worthy Interest and to 
contributed to a candidate of that interest, but a danger arises when an incumbent is not in a 
position to oppose an interest deemed unworthy. It should be noted however that Incumbents 
may often insulate themselves from the pressures and sanctions of PACs. Incumbents ntay use 
direct mall technology to generate contributions from individuals In the district, and through 
the availability of numerous PAC directories and services designed to unite PAC and candidate, 
the incumbent may aggressively solicit PAC contributions from those more hospitable to his
<13
positions. Indeed there are (regrettably) Instances when PACs themselves are subjected to 
excessive pressures by incumbents seeking their support. Finally, there are even instances 
when PACs may assist an Incumbent in opposing an interest he deems unworthy, as in the case ol 
an unrepresentative but financially dominant interest in the district against which the 
incumbent feels compelled on a particular issue to oppose.
It is clear, then, that the votebuying controversy Is complex. It stems from the 
complexity of the decision-making calculus of each incumbent. The motivations of PACs are also 
not entirely clear, and certainly vary widely. Generally it may be the case that, as House 
Majority Leader Thomas Foley has asserted, 'Money follows votes and not the other way
around."132 This is consistent with the research on PAC allocation patterns, though exceptions 
have been noted The studies cited have found a significant effect of PAC contributions only on 
marginal issues. PACs may, therefore, generally neither intend nor (when they do) succeed In 
'buying votes* as the term is popularly conceived.
The influence of PAC contributions should not be understated, however. Even if PACs do 
not engage In explicit votebuying, it Is clear that PACs are often sensitive to incumbent voting ir 
making allocative determinations, a sensitivity of which Incumbents are well aware. It is quite 
conceivable that calculations are made of the future consequences of voting behavior on campalgr 
contributions. PACs may exert considerable Influence by causing the Incumbent to alter his 
voting behavior In anticipation of support (or avoidance of opposition).
The extent of PAC Influence arising from this effect Is most difficult to quanitlfy. As a 
result the full influence of PAC contributions on legislative behavior may not be known. It 
would appear that it Is somewhat limited. One corporate CEO described the Influence of his 
company's PAC us significant only in shaping legislation already destined to be passed In a
manner perhaps more amenable to its interest.133 Generally there are countervailing PAC
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interests acting on the process that serve to negate each others' effectiveness. While dearly 
this is not always the case, PAC influence may still not be controlling. Senator Dole has 
ouipped, "There aren't any poor PAGs or Food Stamp PACs or Nutrition PACs or Medicare
PACs."1^4 Yet these programs do exist. As another example, environmental groups have scorec 
comprehensive vidories over vastly better-funded corporate Interests, who have strenuously 
fought against passage of these measures.
On the other hand, some have perceived a decline in labor's influence and have attributed 
it at least in part to the relative decline of labor PACs vis-a-vis corporate PACs as a source of 
campaign contributions. Jacobson argued that because business-oriented PACs provide 
significant support to incumbent Democrats, these congressman are not financially dependent on 
labor and may, if they desire, vote against labor interests if deemed necessary or prudent, as 
other relations can be cultivated. He asserted the Implication is that a policy realignment could
occur without a party realignment. 135 William Crotty has argued that accessibility of 
alternative funding was not the chief cause in this alleged weakening of labor; rather, it was the
dedine of party strength and unity. 136 while not all have concurred that labor had 
experienced a dedine, Jacobson's observations, made during a period of Republican ascendency, 
have been criticized for failing to account for public sentiment and the message read by
Incumbents into the election results of 1978 and 1980.137 Alexander has suggested that this 
was a period In which organized business interests appeared particularly influential, but by
1982 the pendulum had begun to swing the other way. 138 Finally, few observers question the 
finandal prowess of labor in absolute terms. Generally, however, these observations suggest 
other fadors are more influential in determining the political effectiveness of organized 
interests than political contribution patterns, not to mention the merits of their respective 
positions.
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In sum, PAC contributions may at times exert a perceptible influence on legislative 
behavior, an effect that may be disconcerting, but seldom Is this Influence controlling.
Paralysis of the Legislative Process
A third effect of PACs on the legislative process is alleged by some to be paralysis of the 
policy-making process. Wertheimer has stated that PACs are a major cause of fragmentation of 
our political system; PACs make it increasingly difficult to form a national consensus on Issues
and contribute to the growth of a "special interest state."139 Political parties seek to establish
broad coalitions of support and consent as a basis of legitimacy; PACs inherently do not.140 
Further, PACs, in advocating their particular Interests, have been one of the agents responsible 
for injecting zero sum redistributive issues (for example, abortion) into politics. Jacobson 
has observed;
Congress has particular difficulty dealing with such Issues because normal 
politics-compromise, side payments, logrolling, and other common methods of 
coalitlon-buildlng-do not work. Internal congressional politics thrives on 
deals, on compromise; a focus on external politics promotes posturing and 
In tra n s ig en ce .^ 1
Because of this, PACs may be contributing to a break-down in the policy-making process by 
overloading it with nonoonsensual issues.
A plausible alternative hypothesis Is that the factors contributing to the growth of PACs 
(and decline of parties)-a better Informed electorate and an Increasing unwillingness by It to 
commit to a broad slate of positlons-is responsible for this perceived fragmentation, and that 
PACs are simply responding to these transformations which are themselves the underlying 
cause. It should be noted that the structural fragmentation that exists In Congress, evidenced by 
decreased reliance on the seniority system, a proliferation of seml-autonomous subcommittees, 
and the proliferation of congressional caucuses, predated the growth of PACs. Finally, as Sorauf
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has noted, were there no conflict among goals, political action would be unnecessary. It Is the 
existence of socioeconomic and Ideological cleavages that necessitates politics. Viewed In this
light, political activity by groups, including PACs, may reflect and not create division.'!42 
Thus, If an increasing fragmentation and paralysis of the legislative process has indeed 
occurred, it may be that PACs have not been primarily responsible for it.
PACs In Perspective
Much of the PAC controversy stems from the debate over the role of Interest groups in 
the political system. Those supportive of a vigorous role point out that expression of Interests 
by groups Is a deep-rooted tradition in American politics and is constitutionally protected.
PACs, as modern vehicles for interest groups, allow for interest articulation and influence. 143 
The proliferation of PACs Is seen as beneficial, not detrimental, to pluralistic democracy, 
consistent with the Madisonian view, espoused in Federalist No. to . that a tyranny of factions is 
best prevented by allowing factions to flourish and develop in order that no one can dominate the
process such that incentives for compromise are lost.! 44 Those supportive of a more 
restrained role for interest groups assert that In representing only a narrow Interest, Interest 
groups (and by extension PACs) thwart realization or promotion of the national Interest or
public good. 145 They assert that the sum total of the special interests does not equal the 
national Interest, while the pluralists argue that through the competition of the special interests 
the national interest emerges.
Assessment of the adequacy of these competing contentions Is quite difficult, due In part tc 
definitional problems stemming from an inability to articulate the national interest and to 
distinguish It from special Interests. The conventional view is that interest groups are 
economically self-interested or narrowly focused. However, while it may be that
"'manufacturers do not join an association to which only manufacturers belong merely to 
promote philanthropic or cultural or religious Interests,'" it may also be, as one has concluded, 
that "purposive, ideological Incentives provide the major motivation for joining the National
Association of Manufacturers, not purely economic self-interest."1 <6 Further, Jacobson has 
argued that labor PACs are motivated in pad by such concerns as "redistributing wealth 
downward, promoting the general interests of the working man, and pursuing generally liberal 
economic policies," while Malbln has observed that sizable, diverse corporations utilize PAC 
contributions more "to help people who are more broadly 'pro-business' than to influence any
specific policy relating to a particular line of policy.’ 147 Research by Gopoian on economic 
Interest groups generally confirmed their stereotype as self-interested and narrowly focused 
but also provided evidence to suggest that some PACs pursue less narrow, more "general",
Interests.148 Thus the meaning of the term special interest and its effect on realization of the 
national Interest may be less than clear.
PACs must also be considered in light of their historical context. The emergence of PACs 
did not signal the advent of Interested political giving. Even subsequent to the enactment of the 
Tillman Act of 1907, which outlawed contributions from corporate treasuries to federal 
campaigns, corporate funds still made their way into elections. Executive pay raises were 
awarded for the purpose of being channeled to candidates as individual contributions. Legal and 
extralegal subterfuges for corporate contributing were established, Including gifts to national
party conventions, undisclosed in-klnd contributions, and gifts of suitcases of cash.149 Epstein 
has observed:
The federal laws that governed campaign financing were sufficiently porous and 
the opportunity for Individuals and groups to donate substantial sums of money to 
parties and candidates sufficiently great that PACs were not essential.
Nevertheless, PACs were Important to social interests that sought to raise 
substantial sums of money by means of small donations from geographically
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dispersed but relatively homogenous contributors, particularly where there 
already existed an organization mechanism. Labor unions and some professional 
and trade organizations especially fit this descriptions.! 50
Because campaign contributions were not reported prior to the campaign finance reforms of the
early 1970s, It is unclear whether these reforms, in sanctioning the existence of PACs, have
Increased or have made more visible the role of special Interests.! 51 while It may be that both 
have occurred it Is certainly true that their role has been transformed, In part In that activity 
Is disclosed, reliance on large contributors has decreased, and financial constituencies have 
broadened.
Finally, it may be that the debate over PACs Is to some extent a question of who is being 
politically advantaged by the presence of PACs. It is the liberals who are the primary critics of 
PACs and advocates of reform presently. In the mid-1970s, a period in which labor was 
preeminent, it was the conservatives who most opposed PACs. In 1976, for example, a proposed 
ban on contributions from nonparty political committees backed by Republicans and Southern 
Democrats was narrowly defeated In the Senate. As corporate PACs have achieved parity with 
labor PACs and are believed to be in a position to significantly overtake them in the future, 
conservatives have become much more supportive of PACs. Sorauf has written, "As PAC 
fortunes and the1'  patterns of growth and contribution turn, so obvlously-and very quickly-
do attitudes about them." 152
Com prehensive A ssessm en t
Analysis of the Impact of PACs on the electoral process reveals a complex set of 
relationships, but a number of observations can be made. First, while PACs channel money to 
incumbents for reasons other than ameliorating their reelection prospects, the Impact of this 
tendency may be mitigated by the greater marginal utility of challenger funds and by the 
willingness of PACs to aggressively finance viable challengers. Second, PACs themselves may In
fact exert very little impact on the traditional corporate-labor balance-of-power, though 
corporate financial participation has clearly changed. The impact of PACs on partisan balance 
has been shown to be slight, simply reflecting the varying political climate in which the parties 
operate, and their impact on the vitality of the parties themselves may be only incidental, 
despite their role as occasional competitors. Finally, PACs have managed to Involve more 
citizens In the political process, though the nature and extent of this p v'icipatlon Is disputed.
Conclusions about the influence of PACs on the legislative process are more difficult to 
make. It Is clear that PAC contributions on occasion secure access, and may, further, exert a 
perceptible Influence on incumbent voting, particularly on narrow, technical issues that evade 
public scrutiny, where forces normally Impinging on incumbents-ldeological, partisan, and 
constituent concerns-are Insubstantial or contradictory. Much of the debate focuses on 
competing normative conceptions of the nature of politics. Political decisions made in part on 
the basis of campaign receipts (or anticipation thereof) are clearly antithetical to democratic 
principles. It should be realized, however, that political decisions Involving the allocation of 
scarce resources are Inherently distributive, con'errlng particularized benefit on one at the 
expense of another. Such decisions (as, for example, pork barrel legislation) are seldom made
on the basis of rational calculations of the public interest.153 while this point Is worty of 
note, it should not suggest that political contributions are any more a rational criteria, worthy 
of consideration, for legislative policymaking. Though reform may be warranted, advocates of 
reform should be wary of the unintended consequences of such reform. Most view the 
proliferation of PACs as an unintended consequence of earlier reforms. It has been suggested 
that PACs have become Institutionalized organizational entities with significant interests in 
their continued efficacy, not mere conduits of political contributions. They will pursue 
organizational self-maintenance in some form despite changes in campaign finance regulation.
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For this reason a complete understanding of the oonsoquences of PACs on the political system Is 
desirable as prerequisite for reform.
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